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1. Introduction 
In August 2013 a British Court of Protection ordered the sterilisation of a 36-year old man with 
significant learning difficulties.1 The man, referred to as DE, was reported to have the mental age of a 
person between the ages of six and nine and was for that reason legally incapacitated. He was not 
free to consent to sterilisation. DE was in a long-term relationship with a woman known as PQ who 
also had learning disabilities of a less severe nature. Following the birth of their child in 2010, 
measures were taken to prevent another pregnancy including keeping the couple apart and 
supervising them at all times. This loss of independence led to a serious amount of distress, nearly 
causing the relationship to break. Both DE and PQ were considered unreliable in using contraceptives 
and DE had made it clear that he did not want to have any more children. The Court of Protection 
found the sterilisation to be in the best interest of DE, especially since it was clear that less intrusive 
contraceptive methods would not be suitable for this couple. This ruling was reported to be ground-
breaking and far-reaching because no British court had ever before ordered the sterilisation. In the 
popular press this order was reported as an example of forced sterilisation.2 However, the core issue 
in this case was not non-consensual sterilisation because DE had expressed a wish to be sterilised. It 
was rather a problem of lack of legal capacity which caused the individual to lose all possibilities to 
decide on his own sterilisation without a Court considering the matter. The example proves that 
sterilisation of persons with disabilities in fact poses two distinct problems. Beside the loss of 
capacity, there is also the more traditional problem of people with disabilities who are forced into 
sterilisation against their will, without consent or under pretence. These two problems will be 
discussed in this paper. 
In section 3 we will discuss the vulnerability of individuals with disabilities and the protection against 
sterilisation offered by the ECHR and by the CRPD. We will address non-consensual sterilisation of 
individuals with disabilities and we will also discuss the protection for individuals with intellectual 
disabilities. Lastly we will expand on the right for a person with (intellectual) disabilities not to retain 
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his fertility. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) will be studied and 
compared to and contrasted with the newer and more specific CRPD in order to identify common 
grounds and divergences. We will establish that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
often criticised for being outdated and too vague, is reinterpreted by the Court in an attempt to 
reflect the protection offered by the CRPD. It will become clear that the transformation is not 
complete even though the influence of the CRPD is clear.  
Before zooming in on sterilisation of persons with disabilities, we will discuss the novelties related to 
this topic as introduced by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Section 2 
contains an introduction to the relevant provisions. This section also deals with the CRPD’s new 
decision-making rules concerning individuals with mental, intellectual or psychosocial disabilities.  
 
2. CRPD: a new legal framework 
A. General  
In 2006 a disability-specific human rights treaty was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN.3 A 
specific instrument was considered necessary because individuals with disabilities had remained 
largely invisible under previous, universal human rights instruments. A specific instrument offered 
the advantage of raising the awareness of disability as well as rendering the human rights more 
specific and thus more readily applicable to disability. It was the first time a Convention was drafted 
with the active participation of the target group, in this case organisations representing individuals 
with disabilities. It covers a wide range of rights and should promote equality in many aspects of life.4 
The CRPD marks a paradigm shift in attitudes towards persons with disabilities. Paternalism, charity, 
segregation and medical labels need to be abandoned and replaced by the concepts surrounding the 
newly introduced social model of disability. Contrary to the medical model of disability, the hallmark 
of a social approach to disability emphasizes social prejudice and stereotypes, rather than individual 
defects. Persons with disabilities are considered to be another variation of humankind and are 
therefore equal to others. They are entitled to the same human rights as persons without disabilities. 
Discrimination against individuals with disabilities is considered the direct result of society’s 
incapacity to accommodate the diversity within itself. Under the social model society no longer 
needs protection against these individuals. Instead it is recognised that the built environment and 
society’s negative attitude towards persons with impairments are the main factors disabling and 
excluding these persons. Society needs to be adapted in order to remove these excluding barriers 
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and to promote equality and increase participation and inclusion. The barriers can be of a physical 
nature such as thresholds, stairs etc. The barriers can also be of an immaterial nature: workplace 
rules, structures. In the case of intellectually disabled individuals the barriers are usually of a legal 
nature. Individuals with intellectual disabilities are often considered to lack competence which 
results in the restriction of their legal capacity and in the appointment of a legal guardian. In practice 
this means that the legal guardian, and thus not the individual with a disability, exercises control over 
the person and his affairs.  
The difference between the two models of disability becomes blatantly clear when we turn to the US 
Supreme Court decision Buck v. Bell5 which clearly represents the old model of disability. Justice 
Holmes, writing for the majority in a case concerning the forced sterilisation of a mentally disabled 
young woman, remarked that society’s welfare would be promoted by Carrie Buck’s sterilisation 
because she would no longer be able to spread her genes. The fact that society was considered to be 
in need of protection against the genes of a defective young woman clearly indicates the acceptance 
of the old model. We will establish that this older model and the involuntary sterilisation of Carrie 
Buck would evidently no longer be possible under the ECHR as well as under the new Convention. 
Forced sterilisation would be considered prejudicial to her dignity and would contravene the CRPD. 
This Convention, based on the social model of disability, instead imposes the obligation to make 
efforts to include Carrie Buck in society and allow her to reach her own decisions, if necessary with 
support. This support would need to help her keep her sexuality if that was her wish. The protection 
offered by the CRPD will be discussed below. 
 
B. Legal capacity 
The distinction between a voluntary and a compulsory sterilisation depends on the consent given by 
the person concerned. Consent is a fragile concept when it is used in relation to individuals with 
intellectual disabilities because these persons are often considered to lack the legal capacity to freely 
and voluntarily consent. It is often contended that they can never consent to important decisions 
such as intrusive surgery. In the next part we will uncover the new developments resulting from the 
introduction of this new instrument and we will explore the views of the ECtHR in order to 
investigate the extent to which the principles of the CRPD are accepted.  
It is commonly accepted that individuals with disabilities, more specifically mental, intellectual or 
psychosocial disabilities can never be rational, independent and freely choosing people, which leads 
to the conclusion that they are incompetent to make legally binding decisions. This finding of 
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incompetence often leads to a restriction or even a complete deprivation of their legal capacity. 
Persons with disabilities complained that this restriction was often based on erroneous grounds. In a 
large number of legal systems a person is considered either capable or incapable and the possibilities 
for an incapable person to move back into the group of the capable individuals are scarce. In most 
countries, individuals who are considered incapable before the law are represented or substituted by 
legal guardians, sometimes the parents or care-givers. Sometimes legal guardians are state 
employees or other agencies or persons appointed by a court, who in some cases have never met the 
person. Often decisions are made by legal guardians with or without consulting the individual 
concerned, while in other cases legal guardians need a Court’s approval.6 The provision of a legal 
guardian can lead to the situation in which decisions are made without a person’s knowledge or 
input.  
The CRPD expressly rejects this scheme of incapacity and legal representation by guardians. The 
restriction of a person’s legal capacity is made increasingly difficult. Under this Convention, the 
capacities of a person with disabilities are no longer considered static and it is accepted that 
individuals can learn and grow. Decision making is seen as a variable human attribute and a process 
of communication. The paradigm shift leads to a new presumption: the vast majority of persons 
whether or not they have a disability are more or less able to reason and understand the content and 
consequences of a course of action depending on how much information they receive, in what form 
the information is received, in what context the information is received, how much time is provided 
to process the information, and how much time and opportunity there is to discuss or test the 
information with trusted persons. Acceptance of these premises inevitably leads to the 
abandonment of complete legal incapacity and the paternalistic concept of surrogate decision-
making. Instead it is recognised that some persons with disabilities (as well as some without 
disabilities) require assistance to exercise their legal capacity.  
Article 12 of the CRPD, a true example of the paradigm shift,7 should help individuals with disabilities 
to create more self-empowerment and enjoy their inherent rights. The provision guarantees equal 
recognition before the law and the right to legal capacity in all aspects of life.8 Capacity is to be 
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understood as the capacity to create, modify or extinguish legal relationships.9 Paragraph 2 declares 
that “persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with other in all aspects of life.” 
Paragraph 3 adds positive obligations. States agree to “take appropriate measures to provide access 
by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.” States 
must do what they can to organise support for these individuals and introduce safeguards against 
abuse of such support. This new decision-making scheme is important as it can be used as a stand-
alone obligation but it can also be coupled with all other CRPD provisions. The CRPD Committee has 
for example referred to legal capacity in emphasising the increased risk of being forced into 
sterilisation for people whose legal capacity is not recognised.10 
The nature and extent of the support can vary from person to person and depending on the nature 
of the decision. Support can be needed on one occasion or always, it can take the form of one 
trusted person or a network of people. The principle of reasonable accommodations and especially 
the limit of the disproportionate burden may work to limit the level of support that could reasonably 
be expected to be provided to persons with disabilities. 11 Only when people are unable to achieve 
capacity under the scheme of supported decision making, can substituted decision making 
arrangements be made. These arrangements cannot have a uniform character as they need to be 
closely tailored to the needs of the individual. 12 Blanket restrictions or deprivations are no longer 
acceptable. The process articulated by article 12(4) balances the need to intervene with a range of 
safeguards that are guided by respect for the rights, will and preferences of the person, are 
proportionate to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and interests and are 
sensitive to the deeply embedded discriminatory attitudes which can colour determination for 
capacity. This supported decision-making model has the potential to radically change the legal 
position of individuals with disabilities, but also of elderly people. 13 
Although article 12 was adopted unanimously, it still remains controversial. Practice concerning legal 
capacity of individuals with disabilities varied greatly between the states. Even after ratification there 
have been disagreements over the recognition of legal capacity, recognition of supported decision-
making models and whether article 12 still offered the possibility of adopting substitute decision-
making models such as guardianship. During the ratification process, some countries made 
declarations and reservations on this article. Canada for example, declared its understanding of the 
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provision permits both supported and substituted decision-making arrangements in appropriate 
circumstances and in accordance with the law.14 In the drafting process, views were expressed that 
legal capacity could not be extended to all persons with disabilities. It was pointed out that there 
could exist a number of individuals with disabilities who would not be able to function even with 
support and who would therefore need others to make decisions on their behalf. The 
counterargument was that supported decision making was still preferable because it more fully 
recognises the right of people with disabilities to equal treatment. Even a high level of support would 
be more in accordance with this principle than declaring an individual incapable. Although the 
principles seem relatively clear, it remains to be seen how this provision will be construed by the 
Committee as well as by the states. 
The controversy caused by article 12 CRPD is also perceivable in the case-law of the ECtHR. A 
decision of 2008 seems to be more in line with the general principles of preserving a person’s legal 
capacity and providing a system of supported decision-making than a decision of 2012. In the 2008 
case of Shtukaturov v. Russia15, the ECtHR recognised that the will of a person placed under 
guardianship had to be taken into consideration when a restriction on fundamental rights, such as 
the right to liberty, is concerned. The formal restriction of a person’s legal capacity cannot lead to 
complete incompetence. Shtukaturov was a mentally disabled man who had been declared legally 
incapable upon a request filed by his mother. Unaware of any legal proceedings, Shukaturov missed 
the hearing and was declared incapable with his mother appointed as his guardian. Attempts to 
appeal these decisions were unsuccessful. On his guardian’s request, Shukaturov was then placed in 
a psychiatric hospital where various of his rights were limited, such as receiving visits from his lawyer. 
During the ECtHR proceedings the hospital prevented Shukaturov from communicating with his 
lawyer. The Court found violations of the Convention because no legal safeguards were offered. 
Besides the procedural issues, the Court also noted that Russian legislation envisaged only one 
measure of protection for adults whose mental capacity is restricted due to mental disability. 16 It 
pointed out that the Civil Code “distinguishes between full capacity and full incapacity, but it does not 
provide for any borderline situation.” 17 The Court stressed that Russian legislation did not provide for 
a response tailored to the individual needs of a given person. In its ruling, the Court also referred to 
the principles formulated in a recommendation of the Council of Ministers to the Member States of 
the EU, concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders. 
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18 The general principals included recommendations concerning less intrusive alternatives to legal 
guardianship,19 the idea of maximum preservations of a person’s legal capacity,20 the necessity of a 
proportionality analysis to determine whether measures are necessary and correspond to the needs 
of the individual21, the need for respect for the wishes of the individual concerned,22 and the need to 
limit the duration of any restrictive measure. 23  With respect to medical interventions the 
recommendation proclaims the principle of informed consent where possible, even when a person is 
subject to a measure of protection.24 Even though the Court did not expressly propose the supported 
decision-making model, it clearly accepted that the needs of the individual needed to be of guidance. 
This seemed to be a good first step in the direction of the CRPD. 
Unfortunately, the Court seemed much more willing to accept restrictions or even the deprivation of 
legal capacity in a later decision. In Lashin v. Russia, 25 the ECtHR ruled that states can refer to a 
number of legitimate aims in justifying the deprivation of legal capacity. 26 According to the Court 
some form of denial or restriction of legal capacity, such as partial guardianship, may be necessary 
for “mentally ill persons”. This ruling was the result of a challenge by Mr Lashin, who suffered from 
schizophrenia, against a court ruling that he lacked capacity. Attempts to restore his legal capacity 
failed. When Mr. Lashin’s health deteriorated, he was admitted to hospital and his father was 
replaced as his guardian by the hospital where he resided. The hospital, in its capacity of guardian, 
revoked the request to review his hospitalisation. The Court noted that a decision restricting 
someone’s legal capacity can infringe on the rights listed in article 8 of the Convention. States enjoy a 
margin of appreciation in deciding whether legal capacity can be restored and to what extent. The 
extent of the margin of appreciation is influenced by two factors: firstly, when a measure has a 
drastic effect on a person’s autonomy, the Court will apply a stricter scrutiny. Secondly, the Court will 
pay special attention to the quality of the domestic legal safeguards. The process must be fair and 
such as to ensure due respect of the interests safeguarded by article 8. 27 The vulnerability of the 
targeted group can again strengthen the protection.  
In a 2012 decision, the Court took yet another view and stressed the importance of support in 
decision-making by a legally incapable minor. 28 It will be interesting to see if the controversy at the 
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UN level will continue to blur the path of the ECtHR in relation to legal capacity. If the Court 
continues on the path of supported decision-making, the path it chose in relation to consent of 
minors, it would clearly indicate executing the CRPD provision and adopting the principle of 
autonomy. The support offered to accommodate a free and informed consent, even if the level is 
high, will not violate this principle. 
 
3. Sterilisation 
A. Definitions 
Sterilisation is defined as the medical process or act that renders an individual incapable of sexual 
reproduction.29 It is a method of contraception that is not readily or reliably reversible.  
Voluntary sterilisation on the one hand represents the free and uncoerced choice of an individual to 
limit his or her ability to have children in the future.30 Non-consensual sterilisation on the other hand 
occurs when the sterilisation is not the result of a free and informed choice of the individual 
concerned. Two manifestations of non-consensual sterilisation can be identified. Firstly, forced 
sterilisation occurs when a person is sterilised after expressly refusing the procedure, when the 
procedure is conducted without the individual’s knowledge or when there was no opportunity to 
provide consent. The second type of non-consensual sterilisation is the coerced sterilisation which 
takes place when misinformation or intimidation tactics are used to compel an individual to undergo 
the procedure. Both forms of sterilisation are captured by the terms involuntary, compulsory or non-
consensual sterilisation. These are the all-embracing terms that will be used below.  
It was explained above that complete legal incapacity is no longer accepted under the CRPD. 
Individuals encountering difficulties in reaching the point of the free and informed consent due to 
mental, intellectual or psychosocial disability, will need to be provided with a suitable level of 
support in order to exercise their free will. It will become clear that the legal incapacitation of 
individuals with these disabilities will be of little importance in distinguishing between voluntary and 
compulsory sterilisation. We will start by discussing the vulnerability of individuals with (intellectual) 
disabilities. This will help to explain the level of scrutiny the ECtHR uses in sterilisation cases. We will 
subsequently explore the compulsory sterilisation of individuals with disabilities. The protection 
offered by the CRPD will be contrasted and compared with the protection following from the case-
law of the ECtHR. We will then discuss whether individuals with intellectual disabilities enjoy any 
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additional protection against compulsory sterilisation due to their vulnerability. In the last part, we 
will look into the voluntary sterilisation of individuals with intellectual disabilities.  
 
B. Vulnerability 
In the CRPD as well as in the case-law of the ECtHR, special attention is paid to the vulnerable status 
of individuals with disabilities due to their historical discrimination.  
It is apparent from the need for a provision on sterilisation of individuals with disabilities that the 
drafters of the CRPD considered this group particularly vulnerable. According to the CRPD, groups 
that have in the past been at great risk of violence and abuse, and thus also of (forced) sterilisation, 
are women and children with disabilities.31 Within the group of individuals with disabilities, it seems 
that intellectually disabled individuals are at particular risk of being sterilised because they cannot 
always appreciate the consequences of this type of procedure to the fullest and sometimes they are 
not able to express their will.32 These concerns have led to a number of provisions serving to enhance 
the protection. We will discuss them in detail below.  
Though it took the ECtHR some time to expressly acknowledge it, the Court has also noticed the 
delicate position of individuals with disabilities, notably individuals with intellectual disabilities.33 The 
characterisation by the Court of a group as vulnerable is important because it leads to an increase of 
the protection against intrusions of fundamental rights.34 When a group is considered vulnerable, the 
Court limits the margin of appreciation a state enjoys in taking measures that affect these groups.35 
In Alajos Kiss v. Hungary,36 a case concerning the right to vote of a person placed under partial 
guardianship, the Court initially awarded the State a large margin of appreciation in determining 
whether restrictions on the right to vote can be justified and, if so, how a fair balance is to be struck. 
Despite this wide margin of appreciation the Court did not accept an absolute bar on voting by any 
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person under partial guardianship, irrespective of his or her actual faculties. The Court decreased the 
margin of appreciation again because of the vulnerability of individuals with intellectual disabilities. 
According to the Court “such groups were historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, 
resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice may entail legislative stereotyping which prohibits 
the individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs”37 With this approach the Court not only 
accepted the need to increase the protection granted to persons with (intellectual) disabilities, the 
Court also clearly took the first steps towards embracing the social model of disability. Recent case-
law confirmed the acceptance by the Court of the vulnerability of individuals with disabilities.38 This 
underlying idea will help clarify some of the Court’s decisions. 
 
C. Non-Consensual sterilisation 
a) Introduction 
Non-consensual sterilisation is best illustrated by the US Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell 
mentioned before.39 In 1927 the US Supreme Court was confronted with a constitutional challenge to 
Virginia’s laws concerning forced sterilisation regulation. Carrie Buck, a young woman who had been 
committed to an institution for epileptics and feeble-minded was under an order to undergo non-
consensual sterilisation. She was the daughter of a mentally retarded woman who had been a 
resident at the same institution and prior to her admission she had given birth to a daughter who 
was considered of ‘defective mentality’. Later it was reported that the mother was only mildly 
mentally disabled while the infant who was only a month old when she was labelled as mentally 
defective, was in fact not mentally retarded at all.40 The question before the US Supreme Court was 
whether Virginia’s sterilisation laws were in breach of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. It was argued that the involuntary sterilisation of Carrie Buck would violate her 
constitutional right to bodily integrity or more specifically the inherent right of mankind to go 
through life without mutilation of reproductive organs.41 The argument on behalf of the defendant 
included reference to legal competence. Counsel noted that individuals who were not considered 
incompetent could obtain sterilisation through the exercise of free and informed choice. Therefore 
he contended that equality required the provision of this procedure for those who are considered 
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legally incapable.42 The US Supreme Court upheld the statute and thus gave legal sanction to the 
sterilisation of a great number of individuals. The decision was severely criticised on the grounds of 
inaccuracy of its facts and the questionable philosophical underpinnings.43 Justice Holmes, writing for 
the majority opined that “it is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” He coldly added: “Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough”.44 In this decision the Court articulated the eugenic view that later also inspired the Nazi 
regime to implement a large-scale sterilisation and euthanasia program. Many European countries 
adopted eugenic laws in the 20th century providing for sterilisation through judicial procedure.45  
The eugenics movement arose as a result of a primitive understanding of the hereditability of 
physical traits. The programs stemmed from the worry that the desirable and sensible parts of the 
population would practice birth control and gradually die out, while the sexually careless and reckless 
would have lots of children and come to dominate the population. Selective birth control schemes 
could remedy this imbalance. Sterilisation was even considered necessary and legitimate out of the 
concern for keeping the human race pure and without defects. Often these laws provided for 
sterilisation of men as well as women because of behaviour, disability or ethnic origin. Sterilisation 
was found necessary to protect the wellbeing of the State community or family, in particular because 
the potentially disabled offspring would place a burden on resources and services since parents with 
disabilities, mostly mothers, are not regarded as fit for caring for their children.46 Other reasons 
besides eugenics to justify the non-consensual sterilisation of individuals with disabilities include 
prevention of expressions of sexuality, decreased chances of sexual exploitation, reduced likelihood 
of acquiring sexually transmitted diseases. Sometimes the permanent sterilisation is considered 
easier than teaching menstrual hygiene.47 In another incarnation of sterilisation, some countries with 
high rates of HIV infection used forced sterilisation to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission 
during childbirth.48 This procedure has remained common in some countries despite the fact that the 
risk of transmission has been greatly reduced by the development of medication in the 1990s. These 
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medications are inexpensively available even in countries without fully developed health care 
systems.  
The ethical implications of involuntary sterilisation are grave. 49 The physical and psychological impact 
of the procedure is reported to be profound. The shady past of non-consensual sterilisation of 
individuals with disabilities in the large eugenics programs also leaves its mark. Forcibly or coercively 
ending a person’s reproductive capacities can in some countries lead to exclusion from the 
community and subsequently (extreme) isolation. In the case of intellectually disabled individuals 
forced sterilisation is not just a matter of interfering with a person’s right to bodily integrity, but it 
may also lead to situations where a person is sterilised without his express knowledge or against his 
will. Usually this is the result of the restriction of their legal capacity. 
In 1942 the US Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma50 acknowledged that the right to procreate is 
of a fundamental nature, requiring a compelling state interest to justify interference. The eugenicists’ 
ideals could no longer justify an intrusion on an individual’s fundamental right to make reproductive 
decisions without the interference of others and without the unconsented bodily invasion inherent 
to the sterilisation procedure.51 Additionally, the development of new contraceptives has had an 
influence on the debate. Effective and long-term contraception is a present-day alternative to the 
irreversible sterilisation.  
Even though most sterilisation laws in the USA and in Western Europe have been repealed, this has 
not yet resulted in complete renunciation or cessation of non-consensual sterilisation. This is 
illustrated by a number of cases before the European Court of Human Rights concerning the non-
consensual sterilisation of women, mostly of Roma origin but also women with intellectual 
disabilities. In framing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, it was found 
necessary to include a provision on sterilisation in an attempt to improve and strengthen the right to 
physical integrity.52  
b) Protection against non-consensual sterilisation 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights the protection against non-consensual sterilisation 
is derived from article 8 which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. The article is 
formulated vaguely without direct reference to the protection against compulsory sterilisation. 
However, the case-law of the ECtHR has gradually expanded the meaning of private and family life to 
include the protection of bodily integrity. Article 8 also encompasses the right to personal autonomy, 
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personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings, 
including the right to respect for a person’s decision to become or not to become a parent.53 Public 
authorities must refrain from interfering with these rights unless the interference can be justified on 
the grounds listed in article 8, paragraph 2. Examples of these interferences include forced 
contraception, abortion, sterilisation and dissuasive measures such as taxes on new births.54 The 
interference with the right has to be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society (for reasons of health or morals). The necessity can only be accepted if compelling reasons 
are relied upon. Unfortunately article 8 does not offer more guidance than this as it is a general 
human rights instrument which was adopted long before disability became an issue under human 
rights law. It was not specifically drafted to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities nor was it 
specifically aimed at preventing intrusions such as non-consensual sterilisations.55 
The Court has had the opportunity to fine-tune the guarantees derived from the article in cases 
relating to the non-consensual sterilisation of a number of Roma-women.56 These women alleged 
being forcibly sterilised during delivery by caesarean section. The women all stated they had been 
sterilised without prior information concerning the implications of the surgery. Consent was obtained 
while they were in labour and in pain or after administering anaesthesia. In some of the presented 
cases the consent form contained only a small provision on sterilisation which was illegible or in 
Latin. Some of the applicants stated that their Roma ethnicity was a deciding factor in their 
sterilisations. The Court decided that “the sterilisation procedure grossly interfered with the 
applicant’s physical integrity as she was thereby deprived of her reproductive function. At the time of 
her sterilisation the applicant was twenty years old and therefore at an early stage in her 
reproductive life.57” According to the Court sterilisation lacks the urgency to be considered a life-
saving procedure. It can thus not be performed without the prior and informed consent of the 
patient even when medical staff believes a future pregnancy would put the patient’s life at risk. The 
Court further noted that only exceptional circumstances in which medical treatment cannot be 
delayed and where the appropriate consent cannot be obtained, can justify a sterilisation without 
prior consent.58 The Court added that the patients were not treated with respect for human dignity 
and human freedom by not giving them enough time and information to make a free and informed 
decision. The minimum level of severity required to bring it under the scope of article 3 ECHR 
concerning inhuman and degrading treatment, was reached.59 This decision shows the importance of 
the key concept of the free and informed consent. Without free and informed consent, the 
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sterilisation cannot be performed. This precondition raises difficulties when a legal system facilitates 
the legal incapacitation of individuals with intellectual disabilities because they would no longer be 
capable of freely consenting. 
The Court accepts that article 8 ECHR contains prohibitions as well as positive obligations.60 In the 
case of sterilisation these positive measures relate to introducing legislation which imposes the 
provision of relevant information on the one hand and to securing the reproductive rights of 
individuals through stringent and effective legal safeguards on the other hand. Information needs to 
be made available on the topic of reproduction in general, on the different methods of contraception 
and on sterilisation and its implications. In the case of I.G. and others v. Slovakia, another case on 
forced sterilisation of Roma women, the Court noted that the Slovakian authorities had failed to 
comply with these positive obligations.61  
Case-law shows that the ECtHR sometimes looks beyond its own jurisprudence in order to give a 
comprehensive and contemporary interpretation of the ECHR. The CRPD has already served as a 
source of inspiration to the Court in cases concerning individuals with disabilities in the past.62 The 
principles of the CRPD, which are detailed and contain a lot of positive obligations, are discussed 
below. It is to be expected that these principles will guide the Court when it is presented with a case 
concerning the forced sterilisation of individuals with disabilities. 
Article 23 is a crucial provision of the CRPD on non-consensual sterilisation. It guarantees the right to 
respect for home and the family. Paragraph 1 requires that states “shall take effective and 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities in all matters 
relating to marriage, family, parenthood and relationships on an equal basis with others.” Sentence 
(c) states that “persons with disabilities, including children, retain their fertility on an equal basis with 
others.” During the negotiations of the Convention some countries suggested that non-consensual 
sterilisation needed to be explicitly forbidden. Other states opposed this explicit wording. The 
compromise that was reached was a more positive wording that persons with disabilities have the 
right to “retain their fertility on an equal basis with others.” The provision should make it increasingly 
difficult for national jurisdictions to authorise non-consensual sterilisations when these are not 
imposed by medical necessity. The CRPD Committee, like other monitoring bodies of the other UN 
human rights treaties63, has found that forced sterilisation breaches multiple provisions of the 
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respective treaties such as the right to bodily integrity, family and fertility, the right to health and 
legal capacity.64 
Article 23 clearly contains the obligation to refrain from interfering with the listed rights, but it also 
expressly includes positive obligations including the obligation to provide information and legal 
safeguards. Article 23, 1. (b) states that States Parties are under the obligation to ensure access to 
age-appropriate information and to recognise reproductive and family planning education. Parties 
also agreed to actively provide the means necessary to exercise these rights. Additionally states are 
held to put in place effective legislation and policies to ensure that instances of exploitation, violence 
and abuse against women with disabilities are identified, investigated and prosecuted.  
The CRPD Committee pointed out that States Parties should report on measures taken to protect 
girls and women with disabilities from forced abortions.65 The positive obligations, namely providing 
support in order to ensure that the women themselves are the ones who give their informed consent 
for legal abortion were also underlined.66 In relation to sterilisation the Committee expressed 
concern about the lack of clarity in the scope of legislation to “protect persons with disabilities from 
being subjected to treatment without their free and informed consent.”67  
In addition to the positive obligations under article 23, Article 25 contains the right to enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health. It requires states to ensure that health professionals give 
substance to the human rights of all individuals, including those with (mental) disabilities by 
providing high quality health care without discrimination on the basis of free and informed consent 
and according to the principles of accessibility and acceptability. Services must include the provision 
of sexual and reproductive health and population-based health programmes.  
It is clear that both the CRPD and the ECtHR require a strong protection against non-consensual 
sterilisation of individuals with disabilities. 
c) Non-consensual sterilisation of individuals with intellectual disabilities 
Persons with intellectual, mental and psychosocial disabilities are at greater risk of involuntary 
sterilisation. This was illustrated by the concluding observations of the CRPD Committee on the state 
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reports of China and Peru. 68 The Committee expressed serious concerns in relation to the well 
spread practice of forcibly sterilising mentally incompetent individuals. This greater risk results in a 
higher need for protection. This even stronger protection will be discussed in this section. 
In the case of intellectually disabled individuals, the concept of the free and informed consent which 
serves to determine whether a sterilisation is conducted voluntarily or against a person’s will, is 
problematic. The assumption is easily made that persons with intellectual disabilities are 
incompetent to receive and process information, especially when it concerns important life choices.  
Requests for sterilisation are often introduced by legal guardians. Usually the motives of these 
guardians are rooted in (legitimate) concerns for the person with a disability. Sometimes the best 
interest of the person with a disability does not (completely) coincide with the concerns of thirds, 
including guardians.69 In some cases the sterilisation is requested without the existence of an actual 
need for intrusive measures whereas in other cases the motives are not of a nature that can justify a 
procedure of that kind, for example the wish to limit financial expenditures. The decision to sterilise 
is thereupon usually made by medical professionals70 under the assumption that the person with a 
disability is unable to understand the procedure and its implications.71 
The importance of just motives was demonstrated in a 1986 Canadian case72. The motives to request 
a sterilisation consisted of a mother’s fear of her disabled daughter falling pregnant and of the 
mother’s subsequent responsibility for rearing het grandchild. The Court held that benefit to others 
or to society is not a ground for executing non-therapeutic surgery that could potentially violate the 
physical and mental integrity. The intervention would be excessive for the stated purpose.73 
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So far only one case concerning the non-consensual sterilisation of individuals with an intellectual 
disability has been presented before the ECtHR.74 This case involved five young women with 
intellectual disabilities who had been forcibly sterilised in France between 1995 and 1998. They had 
not been informed about the implications of the surgical procedure and their consent was 
unnecessary. The parents had not consented nor had they shown any intention to do so. Because the 
legal capacity of the young women had been restricted, they had not been able to initiate legal 
proceedings. The non-governmental organisation representing these women lodged a criminal 
complaint in France which was dismissed because the Court found that the surgical procedure was 
performed for medical reasons, was not irreversible and had not been illegal. The Court also found 
that the applicants had not been permanently disfigured. Before the ECtHR counsel alleged a breach 
of Article 3 (freedom from torture, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment), Article 6 (right to 
a fair trial including access to courts), Article 8 (private and family life), and Article 14 (non-
discrimination). The decision of the ECtHR was expected to be an important statement on the 
reproductive rights of persons with disabilities and the positive obligations on the States in 
safeguarding persons with disabilities against compulsory health treatment and abuse but the 
application was considered inadmissible on procedural grounds and was thus never decided on the 
merits. Therefore the Court has not yet directly answered the fundamental question of the strength 
of the protection offered to individuals with intellectual disabilities against involuntary sterilisation 
under the ECHR and the second core issue of the restriction of legal capacity for individuals with an 
intellectual disability. However, the Court has in another case acknowledged that the consent of a 
legal guardian does not necessarily mean that treatment was voluntarily undergone.75 In this case on 
forced hospitalisation, the Court stressed the importance of hearing the patient. Above we 
established that the finding that a person is intellectually disabled will lead to an increased scrutiny 
on the basis of the vulnerability. 
The silence of the ECtHR on this matter stands in contrast to the clarity of the CRPD. In the first place, 
the states are under the obligation to modify the system of legal incapacitation to ensure that all 
individuals can express their will. A correct interpretation of article 12 would immediately strengthen 
the protection offered to individuals with intellectual disabilities. Additionally, article 23 mentioned 
above also applies to individuals with intellectual disabilities. The nature of the disability cannot be a 
reason to violate the protection. The CRPD contains even more principles which would be violated by 
the non-consensual sterilisation of individuals with intellectual disabilities. The main principles of the 
CRPD include autonomy and respect for human dignity.76 Autonomy implies that others need to 
respect the right of a person to hold views, make choices and take actions without interference. The 
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principle entails a negative obligation (the duty to refrain from interferences) but may also include 
positive obligations (the obligation to enable and enhance the ability to make choices). According to 
the principle of autonomy, it is the person concerned who is best able to determine whether 
sterilisation is the right decision for him. The individual needs to be provided with an appropriate 
level of support if this is needed. Involuntary sterilisation represents a clear violation of the respect 
for autonomy. DIMOPOULOS advances the idea of providing veto rights for individuals with intellectual 
disabilities as a way to advance the goal of ensuring human dignity and autonomy. 77 Persons with 
disabilities may not be deemed competent to consent to treatment, yet this does not mean that they 
are also incapable of objecting. This is a very strong means to reach the stated goals, however, veto-
rights would be unnecessary if supported decision-making would replace legal incapacity and legal 
guardianship. Veto-rights are an inherent part of the new scheme. If the paradigm shift is not 
completed, or if the tailor-made model of substituted decision-making for those who can never reach 
capability still does not offer sufficient protection, express and additional veto-rights can be a very 
useful instrument. 
Another CRPD provision aimed at protecting individuals with disabilities against involuntary 
treatment is Article 17, concerning “the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on 
an equal basis with others”. This article serves to ban a range of practices commonly found in 
psychiatric care that compromise the physical and mental integrity of the person. These cases often 
have in common that the institution or hospital, sometimes appointed as guardian, consents to 
medical treatment on behalf of the patient. Sometimes this treatment is administered without the 
knowledge or against the express will of the patient. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment identified among others forced 
abortion or sterilisation without free and informed consent.78 The provision of the CRPD clearly 
states that admission to hospital cannot result in a free pass for amongst others sterilisation. 
 
D. Consensual sterilisation – individuals with intellectual disabilities 
a) Introduction 
Sterilisation of persons with disabilities poses two distinct problems. The first one, the non-consensual 
sterilisation (in general and in the specific case of individuals with intellectual disabilities) was discussed 
above. The other issue affects individuals who are legally incapacitated and are therefore not free to 
decide on permanent sterilisation by themselves. This second problem was illustrated in the British 
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decision of the Court of Protection discussed in the introduction. DE requested the sterilisation himself 
but had to go through court proceedings before a medical professional was willing to perform the 
surgery. The presumption in most legal systems is that competent adults are at liberty to consent to or 
refuse proposed medical treatment. Individuals with intellectual, mental or psychosocial disabilities on 
the other hand, are often considered to lack decision-making skills and are therefore considered 
incapable to give the free and informed consent which is needed for intrusive operations such as 
abortion or sterilisation.79 This results in the impossibility for the person to make a legally valid decision. 
There seem to be two reasons for prudence in relation to sterilisation requests made by individuals with 
disabilities. The first reason is that individuals who are legally incapable, are generally perceived to lack 
the necessary understanding of the ramifications of the procedure and should for that reason be 
protected from ill-considered decisions. Secondly, the generally irreversible nature of the procedure 
requires cautiousness.80 Despite these good reasons, the restriction on the legal capacity of these 
individuals strongly interferes with their autonomy, identified as one of the main principles of the 
CRPD.81 Respect for autonomy results in allowing the individual to weigh the important information and 
reach his own decision concerning sterilisation, if necessary with support.  
b) Voluntary sterilisation 
The CRPD states in article 23 that individuals have the right to enjoy their fertility on an equal basis 
with others. This includes keeping one’s reproductive capacities. The other side of the coin allows 
individuals to freely choose to have their reproductive capacities limited. This right poses problems 
when it is claimed by persons with intellectual disabilities if their legal capacity is restricted or 
deprived. A fair balance needs to be struck between on the one hand protecting the individual with a 
disability from making irreversible life choices with a profound impact and on the other hand 
granting him the autonomy the Convention aims at in order to fulfil other values such as human 
dignity.82 Complete legal incapacity is generally no longer possible. A person with an intellectual 
disability will need to balance the information he finds and receives, and reach a decision, if 
necessary with an appropriate level of support. The CRPD Committee stressed the importance of 
support in order to ensure that the persons with disabilities themselves are the ones who give their 
free and informed consent for health decisions including sterilisation.83  
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The ECtHR has so far never had the opportunity to deal with the issue of free and informed consent 
in relation to sterilisation by individuals with disabilities. In one of its rulings on the sterilisation of 
Roma women, the Court stated that the procedure can only be executed after having obtained the 
free and informed consent of the patient. 84 The informed consent requires that a patient is given 
material information, including information about the proposed treatment and its risks, benefits and 
alternatives. The States are under a positive obligation to provide this information.  
In a case concerning the non-consensual sterilisation of a minor, who at the time also lacked legal 
capacity due to her age, the Court held that the individual had the right to freely decide on the 
procedure, with the help of a representative.85 The young woman had been sterilised shortly before 
her 18th birthday. Neither her opinion nor the mother’s consent had been asked. It seems only logical 
that the Court would adopt this same position when the person requesting the sterilisation was a 
person with an (intellectual) disability. Good and appropriate support, as it follows from the CRPD, 
can help remove the barriers for individuals with disabilities in their right not to retain their fertility. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Sterilisation of individuals with disabilities is not always a matter of involuntary sterilisation. We 
established that the dark past of eugenics hinders individuals with disabilities, in particular 
individuals with intellectual disabilities, in their right to freely decide on their reproductive capacities. 
What distinguishes one from the other is the concept of free and informed consent. It is obvious that 
involuntary sterilisation lacks this component. The protection against these practices is strongly 
embedded in the CRPD as well as in the case-law of the ECtHR. However, this protection can turn 
into overprotection when individuals with intellectual disabilities are involved. Individuals with these 
types of disabilities are regularly deemed incapable of freely consenting to intrusive treatment such 
as sterilisation. For this reason they were often de facto excluded from such surgery. The CRPD 
provides a new decision-making model, supported decision-making instead of substituted decision-
making, based on the abilities of people instead of their (medical) defects. The model is based on 
principles including autonomy, participation and inclusion. If it is transposed correctly, it would put 
disabled persons in a position in which their access to such surgery would no longer be hindered by 
generalising assumptions. The case-law of the ECtHR was studied to examine the extent to which the 
principles derived from the CRPD have already penetrated. It seems that supported decision-making 
has not been fully accepted yet. It remains to be seen which general direction the Court will choose.  
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